Mental health clinicians treating youth in foster care face several ethical challenges, such as competence for treating youth in foster care, understanding who can provide informed consent, and confidentiality. However, few articles have addressed these ethical concerns or provided recommendations for clinicians on how to navigate these issues. This article presents a brief summary of the foster care system, an overview of the major ethical challenges clinicians may encounter when treating youth in foster care, areas of the American Psychological Association’s (...) Ethics Code, Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social Workers, and American Counseling Association Code of Ethics most germane to the treatment of youth in foster care, and general recommendations for clinicians treating this population. (shrink)

This volume explores the role of some of the most prominent twentieth-century philosophers and political thinkers as teachers. It examines what obstacles they confronted as teachers and how they overcame them in conveying truth to their students in an age dominated by ideological thinking.

Attentional control theory suggests that high cognitive demands impair the flexible deployment of attention control in anxious adults, particularly when paired with external threats. Extending this...

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Social purpose initiatives rarely take place in one sector or policy domain. They are likely to cross sector, community, local, national and indigenous boundaries and, in so doing, require alternative governance arrangements that are responsive and sustainable. This article focuses on the process of forging cross boundary governance processes drawing on a case study characterised by complex cross sector demands. The subject of the case study is a paradigm-breaking primary health and well-being initiative for a region of New Zealand with (...) longstanding healthcare challenges but contemporary possibilities. We were invited by the owners of this initiative to record and reflect on the challenges and successes, and from this to identify what might be possible for future innovations. In doing so we draw on the adaptive governance literature to frame the governance challenges and offer five paradoxes requiring collective navigation. We recognise the importance of our need to engage with Indigenous scholarship in future analyses and conclude with a series of recommendations on how such paradoxes are navigated for those needing to build governance practice in innovative social purpose initiatives. (shrink)

This article analyses a footnote to the third version of the ‘Work of Art’ essay in which Walter Benjamin presents an account of ‘a certain oscillation’ between ‘cult value’ and ‘exhibition value’ as typical of the reception of all works of art. Benjamin's example in that footnote is the Sistine Madonna, a painting by Raphael in the Dresden Gemäldegalerie that has played an important part in German aesthetics since Winckelmann. Benjamin's footnote on the Sistine Madonna, along with his critique of (...) Hegel's aesthetics in that context, demand to be understood in relation to his remarks on Dada elsewhere in the artwork essay, and to his claim that technological reproducibility leads to the ‘actualization’ of the original reproduced. In that connection, the article concludes with an analysis of Kurt Schwitters's 1921 montage picture Knave Child Madonna with Horse. (shrink)

This study used historical research methodology to assess the work of US nurses caring for patients with cancer from 1920 to 1950. Primary sources, obtained from several US archives, included nursing procedure books, student nurses’ lecture notes, hospital and nursing annual reports, and meeting minutes. Secondary sources included journal articles and textbooks. The aim was to document the clinical work of nurses caring for patients with cancer and assess this work for evidence of emerging specialization in cancer nursing. Following a (...) review of cancer in the 1920s, nursing education specific to cancer, nursing care related to specific cancer therapies, and the practice of concealing a diagnosis of cancer, were examined. Nurses were consistently educated in cancer nursing, but their cancer education became more focused over the decades. Nurses were closely involved with cancer patients as they monitored their patients’ radium or assisted patients following radical surgery. The issue of concealing the diagnosis of cancer was problematic to some nurses. This paper reveals the nature of nurses’ hospital work with cancer patients and demonstrates a core body of cancer nursing knowledge. The emergence of cancer nursing as a specialty is presented. (shrink)

The rapid advancement of new digital technologies, such as smart technology, artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, robotics, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things (IoT), is fundamentally changing the nature of work and increasing concerns about the future of jobs and organizations. To keep pace with rapid disruption, companies need to update and transform business models to remain competitive. Meanwhile, the growth of advanced technologies is changing the types of skills and competencies needed in the workplace and demanded a shift (...) in mindset among individuals, teams and organizations. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated digitalization trends, while heightening the importance of employee resilience and well-being in adapting to widespread job and technological disruption. Although digital transformation is a new and urgent imperative, there is a long trajectory of rigorous research that can readily be applied to grasp these emerging trends. Recent studies and reviews of digital transformation have primarily focused on the business and strategic levels, with only modest integration of employee-related factors. Our review article seeks to fill these critical gaps by identifying and consolidating key factors important for an organization’s overarching digital transformation. We reviewed studies across multiple disciplines and integrated the findings into a multi-level framework. At the individual level, we propose five overarching factors related to effective digital transformation among employees: technology adoption; perceptions and attitudes toward technological change; skills and training; workplace resilience and adaptability, and work-related wellbeing. At the group-level, we identified three factors necessary for digital transformation: team communication and collaboration; workplace relationships and team identification, and team adaptability and resilience. Finally, at the organizational-level, we proposed three factors for digital transformation: leadership; human resources, and organizational culture/climate. Our review of the literature confirms that multi-level factors are important when planning for and embarking on digital transformation, thereby providing a framework for future research and practice. (shrink)

BackgroundDecision-making in initiating life-sustaining health technology is complex and often conducted at time-critical junctures in clinical care. Many of these decisions have profound, often irreversible, consequences for the child and family, as well as potential benefits for functioning, health and quality of life. Yet little is known about what influences these decisions. A systematic review of reasoning identified the range of reasons clinicians give in the literature when initiating technology dependence in a child, and as a result helps determine the (...) range of influences on these decisions.MethodsMedline, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychINFO, Web of Science, ASSIA and Global Health Library databases were searched to identify all reasons given for the initiation of technology dependence in a child. Each reason was coded as a broad and narrow reason type, and whether it supported or rejected technology dependence.Results53 relevant papers were retained from 1604 publications, containing 116 broad reason types and 383 narrow reason types. These were grouped into broad thematic categories: clinical factors, quality of life factors, moral imperatives and duty and personal values; and whether they supported, rejected or described the initiation of technology dependence. The majority were conceptual or discussion papers, less than a third were empirical studies. Most discussed neonates and focused on end-of-life care.ConclusionsThere is a lack of empirical studies on this topic, scant knowledge about the experience of older children and their families in particular; and little written on choices made outside ‘end-of-life’ care. This review provides a sound basis for empirical research into the important influences on a child’s potential technology dependence. (shrink)

Cywydd Ffarwelio Rhys MERERID HOPWOOD Mae awr i fwynhau miri, y mae awr mi wn am hwyl cwmni, ond nawr, yn ein dathliad ni, mae un na fynnaf mo'ni. ...

Aristotle believed that there were actually only three colours present in the rainbow, : of these, the first is produced by the dulling of white light when it is reflected in or obscured by a dark medium such as smoke, cloud, or water, and exemplified in the redness of the sun as seen through haze around the horizon. Successive failures of sight weaken the colour further, first to πράσινov and then to άλoυργóν. Between the first two colours a fourth, ξανθóν, (...) is often apparent, being the result of the juxtaposition of the two colours. This last statement, where it has not been ignored as one of the inexplicable or misguided things Aristotle says from time to time, has met with considerable criticism. (shrink)

Aristotle believed that there were actually only three colours present in the rainbow, : of these, the first is produced by the dulling of white light when it is reflected in or obscured by a dark medium such as smoke, cloud, or water, and exemplified in the redness of the sun as seen through haze around the horizon. Successive failures of sight weaken the colour further, first to πράσινov and then to άλoυργóν. Between the first two colours a fourth, ξανθóν, (...) is often apparent, being the result of the juxtaposition of the two colours. This last statement, where it has not been ignored as one of the inexplicable or misguided things Aristotle says from time to time, has met with considerable criticism. (shrink)

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

This book offers a critical introduction to the work of American philosopher D. G. Leahy (1937-2014). Leahy's fundamental thinking can be characterized as an absolute creativity in which all creating is 'live' -- a happening occurring now that manifests a supersaturated polyontological actuality that is essentially created by the logic that characterizes it. Leahy leaves behind the categorial presuppositions of modern thought, eclipsing both Cartesian and Hegelian subjectivities and introducing instead an essentially new form of thinking founded in a nondual (...) logic of creation. The new thinking delineates the absolute unicity of existence as a creative interactivity beyond all traditional dichotomies (such as one vs. many, unity vs. plurality, identity vs. change): a fully "digitized" actuality that is nothing but newness, which inherently implies nothing but change. Through this new form of thinking, change itself is revealed to be the very essence of reality and mind. Any reader looking for a quantum leap beyond the thrall of modern and postmodern fixations is invited to hear and apprehend this new thinking that refuses to be conditioned by paradigms, categories, species, genera, walls, bridges, boundaries, or abstractions: an essentially free thinking that embodies creative novelty itself. (shrink)

Suffering can make sacred, so it may partly be nature, and not culture alone, that leads us to apprehend a sacred aspect in victims of oppression. Those who recognize this sacredness show piety—a special form of respect—toward members of oppressed groups. The result is a system of social constructions often dismissed as “identity politics.” This essay starts with an analysis of the intentionality of piety and sacredness and how they relate to suffering, sacrifice, sanctions, pollution, and purification. It then argues (...) that the sacralization of oppressed groups is an expression of the perennial human disposition to acknowledge sacredness and to respond piously. The essay then analyzes this sacred status as socially constructed. Based on the sacred-making power of suffering, the sacred status elicits piety, gives its bearers special authority, surrounds them with sanctions, and calls for symbolic sacrificial punishments of the impious. By dissecting sacrificial politics as a system of social constructions, we see that, although the oppressed groups are made sacred, certain people in the oppressor groups—“the Pious”—continue to exercise fundamental power. This essay, by displaying the inner logic of this cultural phenomenon, helps us both to sympathize with and to critique the system and then to pose questions about what good or bad the system might be doing. (shrink)

This paper begins with a sketch of a few themes in the philosophy of property insofar as they relate to the concept of cultural appropriation. It then offers a survey of Edmund Husserl’s account of culture. These reflections put us in a better position to ask whether property ownership provides a suitable interpretative framework for acts of intercultural copying and influence. On the contrary, Husserl’s account of culture leads us away from the claim that members of a cultural group should (...) be understood to have property in cultural formations arising within their group. By putting meaning, rather than ownership, at the center of our understanding of culture, the paper offers an alternative account of what might be wrong, when there is something wrong, with events typically labeled culturally appropriative. The paper concludes by connecting concerns for cultural appropriation with conceptions of cultural authenticity, distinguishing between an autochthonal sense of authenticity, focused on internal origins and protection from outside forces, and a Husserlian sense of authenticity, connected to reason, responsibility, and truth. (shrink)

As an incapacitated patient is unable to make decisions regarding their care, physicians turn to next-of-kin when appointing a surrogate decision-maker in the absence of an advanced directive. With the increasing complexity of modern families, physicians are facing new ethical dilemmas when choosing the individual to make end-of-life decisions for their patients. Legal definitions and hierarchies are no longer adhering to the purpose of a surrogate-decision maker, which is to maintain a patient’s autonomy. Moral criteria for surrogates, which emphasize the (...) importance of making decisions that align with the patient’s desires and wishes and negate biological relationships over emotional connections, are becoming much more important. This paper explores a case study in which physicians must appoint a surrogate decision-maker for an incapacitated patient, forced to choose between a biological relationship and a strong emotional connection. (shrink)

Health care reform in the United States and United Kingdom has resulted in the cross-fertilization of policy. The “new” health care models adopted by the two jurisdictions utilize free market principles for reasons of quality, efficiency, and cost, but also feature characteristics of a state-run model, through the provision of a safety net for citizens and a buffer against the commodification of health. In this sense, the health care systems of the US and UK are more congruent than they were. (...) Here we identify two distinct narratives that emerge from health care reform undertaken in these jurisdictions. The “revolutionary” narrative views the reforms as fundamental change whilst the “evolutionary” narrative accepts them as natural development. We argue that neither the revolutionary nor the evolutionary narrative adequately characterizes the reforms undertaken in health care because neither takes sufficient account of the broader setting in which reform has occurred. In seeking to examine and explain the jurisdictions' apparent drive to the middle, we propose a distinctive evolutionary narrative, that of “convergence,” which, as well as adopting a less parochial perspective on developments in health care policy and provision, also situates the reforms politically, constitutionally, and comparatively. (shrink)

Two narratives have emerged to describe recent health care reforms in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. One narrative speaks of revolution, that the adoptions of the Affordable Care Act 2010 in the US, and the Health and Social Care Act 2012 in the UK, have resulted in fundamental, large-scale philosophical, political and legal change in the jurisdictions’ respective health care systems. The other narrative evokes evolution, identifying each new legislative scheme as a natural development of existing (...) governance structures. Policymakers in both the US and UK face the problem of a health care system which, as traditionally envisaged, cannot offer universal access to health care at a reasonable, or politically acceptable, price. (shrink)

This essay suggests that to read black art the viewer is obliged to read what is not there. What does this paradoxical statement imply? First, it implies that every black image is a caricature—a refusal—of the blackness of its concept; and to that extent what we see as black is no longer readable or seeable as image (or Dasein). Secondly, taking as my example the singular relation between pain and image in the artwork of Donald Rodney, and in particular the (...) notion of a corpus exanime, I examine the implications of this notion for the traditions of art, philosophy, and aesthetics more generally. (shrink)

A close analysis of contemporary and historical extraction of Caspian oil and its transportation, via pipeline and tanker, to central Europe, frames an investigation into interrelationships between the organization and conditioning of European societies and their fuel mobility systems. For the fuel used for contemporary mobility systems relies on the mobility systems of fuel. The article examines the governmental and capital structures that have driven oil consumption growth since the 1870s, enabled the powering of geopolitics and determined the spatiality of (...) carbonized sociotechnical systems. It unpacks the current forces that resist any shift away from this petroculture, any ‘powering down’ of society. (shrink)

In this essay I reconsider Lacan’s theory of the signifier in relation to the late concept lalangue and blackness. The article is intended as a summary of the arguments put forward in the author’s Lacan Noir (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

The four essays collected in this dossier are directed upon the contemporary understandings of blackness, as an ontology, a phenomenology, or a historicity. In the order of their presentation they encompass and situate what seems first to limit black being or overflow it, but which, when questioned, that is, disclosed, or unconcealed, does not fit into this logos, nor is ordered by it, even making what is most discernable about blackness in its past, future, or present, seem imaginary, moored in (...) a non-present,and presence, but in ways which make the non-being that marks blackness as sign, affect, or speaking being, unthinkable except as an appearing, a manifestation, an identity.As a dossier directed upon the present philosophical understanding of blackness, each paper seeks to unanchor blackness from the meanings and presuppositions that it normally calls forth. Beyond what is discernable, or ready-made, each paper addresses structures that make (and have made) blackness discernable as the always given to be seen, as meaningless speech, as pathology, as a concept beyond reason.The dossier opens with a question: what kind of disturbance does blackness present to being? Why does it seem to madden reason, or call forth frenzy? In Calvin Warren’s essay, “The Karen Call,” what comes into correlation with blackness are various kinds of emergency that structure white thought and presence but that belie witnessing and intelligibility, and in whose chain of significations can be discerned an ontological privilege that constitutes the world. To appear emergent, it seems, all blackness has to do is become one with the myth that bans or compromises it; a manifestation in which subject-object relations are already polarized by the dangers that deploy it in dramas of emergency. Once blackness becomes emergent, there is no escape, for it comes up against what Warren, reading Heidegger against the grain, suggests is a racial destiny of Being. To appear black is forthwith to resemble an es gibt that is indissociable from threat, falsehood, fantasy, and obliteration. To that extent, blackness attests to a kind of ontological emergency without surcease or hope, and one whose trace remains in every moment or glimpse; whose technical modality and structure always returns us to the call that is neither speech nor gaze, word nor symbol, but represents an extimacy that is undeconstructable, beyond utterance, meaning, or reparation.Such extimacy seems to induce a crisis in the philosophical notion of being itself. In Axelle Karera’s essay, “Paraontology,” the question asked is why blackness cannot be contained or fitted into ontology itself; or, if philosophy is ontology, why does blackness seem to signify an irreducible resistance to it?How does such resistance occur? If blackness can only be presented as “paraontology,” a word that seems to shelter ontology at the same time as it presents the search for a new order of being, what does the para teach us about blackness as disorder, resistance, or identity? What is its philosophical genealogy and affiliation, and why does the para itself seem to never get beyond its own conciliation, or filiation to philosophy, whose ordering and racist historicity thereby remains the seme and mark of the para as interval, trope, and index? Or, put more simply, can blackness ever resist its own resistance as trope, conjuncture, or representation? Retracing that genealogy through the work of Oskar Becker, Karera uncovers a surreptitious repetition in black uses of the word, in whose weave can be discerned a fascist interference that not only undermines the fugitivity of the resistance so claimed, but one that unwittingly repeats a fascist ontology of world, history, and being.1 It’s a startling, deeply disturbing claim. But the apparent echoing of the Heideggerian bell in black significations of ontology suggests that what is being reabsorbed here is not so much a radical difference but a concept that remains justified and in fee to, pardoned and annulled by, a white notion of being. What, then, can it mean to think blackness as para? Nothing more than a philosophical confusion that confuses l’être qui fuit, that is, the lack that Lacan says cannot be completed or resisted, for an appositional fantasy of displacement. Here everything that is deemed black has to be made meaningful in apposition to ontology, but everything that is black must also, it seems, always return apposition to the white para of ontology; to be black and appositional would, it seems, produce only the disavowal of the philosophical genealogy that always already determines it.One would be right to distrust such claims—the moralism of the refusal, and the scandal of the faux resistance by which the para hides behind its own whited-out screen.In the third contribution to the dossier, the question asked is what would it mean for blackness to repair itself, to let go or retrieve and so redeem its own historical conjuncture? How do we refer to an irreparable past, that is, a past that keeps on coming back, but one that has no sign or signified, no memory that can recapture or reveal it, or simply rejoin us to it without remainder? Rinaldo Walcott’s essay, “‘Retrospective Significance,’” revisits the reparations debate as a question of black being. Instead of repair, he finds desolation and emptiness, or what he calls a staggeringly incoherent rhetoric of coherency. It’s a paradox that addresses what it means to remember or to forget a nothing; if blackness is nothing, how does one reconnect with it, bond with it, compensate it in its historic devastation? What would it mean to receive meaning from such devastation, to express it if this nothingness is absolute, or absolutely valueless? If ontology is a structure, then blackness, Walcott suggests, expresses nothing less than a “slave-ness” that continues to confront and disturb us absolutely, irrevocably. As such slave-ness is the trace that remains as a sign of the irreparable. As a trace, and not a sign, slave-ness becomes the primordial signifier of being, nation, history, and diaspora. But it is what makes it irrecuperable that defines its value and difficulty for the very language of reparation. Walcott pursues this difficult, enigmatic thread through the work of black thinkers on diaspora and identity. He concludes: black being cannot be dissociated from the disturbance it offers value, conscience, and any thought of alterity.The final and fourth contribution returns to the question of blackness as the trace or thread (the monstration) of being. How does one follow the thread (montrer) of blackness if it is always already withdrawn from being? David Marriott’s essay, “Ontology and Lalangue,” evokes Lacan’s concept of lalangue in pursuit of this enigmatic equivocation between letter and signifier, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Showing how both discourses have sought to master this exorbitance as master and/or free it as slave, I show how blackness is extinguished by the very words used to precipitate it into being. The slavish audacity of this lalangue is then shown to disarticulate, or more exactly, withdraw from ontology, but only so that whiteness can be presented and proclaimed all the more as the un-representable truth and logic of Dasein. This way of excluding blackness while preserving whiteness is not only central to philosophical and psychoanalytic understandings of language, Marriott argues, but this way of manifesting itself without manifesting itself is also crucial to the racialization of the logos as such.What is essential here is the way a meaning that is beyond meaning or representation is inserted into a problematic of mastery and servitude that advances-conceals a racial genealogy but in ways that makes the being of blackness an enigma. As such, blackness becomes an exorbitance that is always effaced in its monstration. More, its revelation must necessarily be unrecognized as the very locus of knowledge and truth. In that sense, what would it mean to figure, or to speak, this n’est pas without the consolation of being, meaning, truth, or logic? What would it mean to represent it as situated or defined by the language of ontology? Is black speaking being always in a relationship to and simultaneously the manifestation of a lalangue of lalangue? (shrink)

In Of Effacement, David Marriott endeavors to demolish established opinion about what Blackness is and reorient our understanding of what it is not in art, philosophy, autobiography, literary theory, political theory, and psychoanalysis. With the critical rigor and polemical bravura which he displayed in Whither Fanon? Marriott here considers the relationships between language, judgement and effacement, and shows how effacement has become the dominant force in anti-Blackness. Both skeptically and emphatically, Marriott presents a series of radical philosophical (...) engagements with Fanon's "is not" (n'est pas) and its "Black" political truth. How does one speak - let alone represent - that which is without existence? Is Blackness n'est pas because it has yet to be thought as Blackness? And if so, when Fanon writes of Blackness, that it is n'est pas (is not), where should one look to make sense of this n'est pas? In Of Effacement, Marriott anchors these questions by addressing the most fundamental perennial questions concerning the nature of freedom, resistance, mastery, life and liberation, via a series of analyses of such key figures as Huey Newton, Nietzsche, Malcolm X, Edward Said, Georges Bataille, Stuart Hall, and Lacan. He thus develops the basis for a reading of Blackness by recasting its effacement as an identity, while insisting on it as a fundamental question for philosophy. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay takes up Huey Newton’s notion of revolutionary suicide. Against the objection that black suicide is merely reactive, Newton proposes that revolutionary suicide follows other principles and demonstrations. Revolutionary suicide is resistant but in ways that does not make it always possible to distinguish between resistance and reaction—in fact, Newton argues that black revolutionary suicide should be considered a life-affirmation, and that this affirmation reveals a will to power in a decidedly Nietzschean sense. This means—if we read suicide as (...) resistant in its reactions—that black affirmation cannot be read on the order of a sovereign decision (as a sacrificial relation to life and death); nor as will, representation, or as a refusal which always relates to an end (the end of oppression, or injustice). This is why, strictly speaking, Newton’s reading of revolutionary suicide is not to be confused with a classical notion of sovereignty (whether that of Bataille or Mbembe), nor with the political definition of self-murder as resistance (by Spivak, or Puar). At the end of this essay, the notion of revolutionary suicide is shown to be something else altogether. That is to say, revolutionary suicide serves not only to realize the form of the one and the multiple (according to a non-messianic and non-sacrificial economy), but also puts into question the presumed inescapable relation between blackness and state murder (due to the relentless nature of necropower and anti-blackness). (shrink)